[crypto] [secdm at tue.nl: REMINDER: Crypto Working Group, 7 december 2012]

R. Hirschfeld ray at unipay.nl
Wed Dec 5 18:00:16 CET 2012


------- Start of forwarded message -------
From: Secretariaat DM <secdm at tue.nl>
To: Secretariaat DM <secdm at tue.nl>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2012 12:09:14 +0100
Subject: REMINDER: Crypto Working Group, 7 december 2012

CRYPTO WORKING GROUP


Friday, December 7, 2012

                                                De Kargadoor (http://www.kargadoor.nl/utrecht/zaalverhuur.html)
                                                Oudegracht 36, Utrecht



Program

10.45 - 11.30 hrs.    Jasper van Woudenberg (Riscure),
>From space rays to laser beams: Fault injection in practice
            (Abstract below)

11.30 -  11.45 hrs.    Coffee / tea break

11.45 - 12.30 hrs.     Jeroen Doumen (Irdeto),
Faster batch forgery identification

12.30 -  14.00 hrs.    Lunch break (lunch not included)

14.00 - 14.45 hrs.     Ludo Tolhuizen (Philips Research),

                                           Towards fully collusion-resistant ID-based establishment of pairwise keys
                                                (Abstract below)

14.45 - 15.00 hrs.     Coffee / tea break

15.00 - 15.45 hrs.     Boris Skoriç (TU/e),

Quantum PUFs: from silly joke to reality



Abstract talk Jasper van Woudenberg, From space rays to laser beams: Fault injection in practice

Fault injection attacks are moving into the realm of embedded systems: secure memory 'readers' that use glitching to bypass security mechanisms are commercially available, and more recently Xbox 360 code security was broken by glitching the processor's reset line. Fault injection attacks aim to change the behavior of a device; e.g. to bypass authentication or extract secret information. We explain the fundamentals of fault injection, covering their history, the tools used for their execution, Differential Fault Analysis and other attacks that we execute in practice.

Abstract talk Ludo Tolhuizen, Towards fully collusion-resistant ID-based establishment of pairwise keys

We discuss the problem of securely establishing a symmetric key to be applied in a symmetric key algorithm.  This classical problem is still relevant and of paramount importance both in existing computer networks and new large-scale ubiquitous systems comprising resource-constrained devices. Identity(ID)-based pairwise key agreement allows for the generation of a common key between two parties from secret keying material owned by the first party and the identity of the second one. However, existing methods, e.g., based on polynomials, are prone to collusion attacks.

We discuss a new key establishment scheme aiming at fully collusion-resistant ID-based symmetric-key agreement. Our scheme, the HIMMO algorithm, relies on two design concepts: Hiding Information and Mixing Modular Operations. We show why attacks on ID-based symmetric key agreement from literature, as well as some other attacks, cannot be applied to HIMMO.  The simple logic of the HIMMO algorithm allows for very efficient implementations in terms of both speed and memory.
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