[crypto] [secdm at tue.nl: REMINDER Crypto Working Group, May 27, 2016]

[R. Hirschfeld]

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From: Secretariaat DM <secdm at tue.nl>
Subject: REMINDER Crypto Working Group, May 27, 2016
Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 10:21:18 +0000

Dear all,

Just to remind you about the CWG-meeting on Friday, May 27, 2016.

With kind regards / Met vriendelijke groeten,
Anita Klooster
secretary of the section Discrete Mathematics

[cid:image001.gif at 01CB8FB5.88A9C0F0]

Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science
MF 4.058
Office hours: Monday and Friday 08.30-12.30 h / Tuesday and Wednesday 08.30-17.00 h
Telephone: +31 (0)40 2472254
Email: secdm at tue.nl<mailto:secdm at tue.nl>




CRYPTO WORKING GROUP


Friday, May 27, 2016
                                                De Kargadoor (http://www.kargadoor.nl/utrecht/zaalverhuur.html)
                                                Oudegracht 36, Utrecht



Program

10.45 – 11.30 hrs.   Joeri de Ruiter (RU Nijmegen),

Protocol State Fuzzing of TLS Implementations

11.30 -  11.45 hrs.   Coffee / tea break


11.45 - 12.30 hrs.    Roger Dingledine (MIT),
Tor onion services: more useful than you think

12.30 -  14.00 hrs.   Lunch break (lunch not included)


14.00 - 14.45 hrs.    Seth Schoen (Electronic Frontier Foundation),

                                    Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated Certificate Authority


14.45 - 15.00 hrs.    Coffee / tea break


15.00 - 15.45 hrs.    Rachel Greenstadt (Drexel Univ.),

                                   Deanonymizing Programmers



Abstract talk Joeri de Ruiter: Protocol State Fuzzing of TLS Implementations

We describe a largely automated and systematic analysis of TLS implementations by what we call ‘protocol state fuzzing’: we use state machine learning to infer state machines from protocol implementations, using only blackbox testing, and then inspect the inferred state machines to look for spurious behaviour which might be an indication of flaws in the program logic. For detecting the presence of spurious behaviour the approach is almost fully automatic: we automatically obtain state machines and any spurious behaviour is then trivial to see. Detecting whether the spurious behaviour introduces exploitable security weaknesses does require manual investigation. Still, we take the point of view that any spurious functionality in a security protocol implementation is dangerous and should be removed.

We analysed both server- and client-side implementations with a test harness that supports several key exchange algorithms and the option of client certificate authentication. We show that this approach can catch an interesting class of implementation flaws that is apparently common in security protocol implementations: in three of the TLS implementations analysed new security flaws were found (in GnuTLS, the Java Secure Socket Extension, and OpenSSL). This shows that protocol state fuzzing is a useful technique to systematically analyse security protocol implementations. As our analysis of different TLS implementations resulted in different and unique state machines for each one, the technique can also be used for fingerprinting TLS implementations.



Abstract talk Roger Dingledine: Tor onion services: more useful than you think

We'll update you on what's going on with Tor onion services, aka Tor hidden services.

In the past, onion services were mostly run by people who wanted to set up a website that somebody else wanted to shut down. Increasingly, people are recognizing that onion services are much more broadly useful: they are about providing more security to users, not hiding websites.

Over the last year or so, Facebook set up an onion service to let their users reach Facebook more securely, the IETF officially designated '.onion' as a reserved domain, we've been talking to the "Let's Encrypt" folks about giving an onion address to every website, some neat new apps are coming out that use onion services (like decentralized chat), and more. We also have some actual stats on hidden services: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/some-statistics-about-onions

At the same time, we've been working on next-generation onion services. We'll explain why they greatly improve both security and scalability.



Abstract talk Seth Schoen: Let's Encrypt: A Free, Automated Certificate Authority

To help make TLS ubiquitous, a group led by Mozilla, the University of Michigan, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation has created the Let's Encrypt certificate authority.  This CA fully automates the process of issuing TLS server certificates at no charge to the subscriber.  System administrators can now obtain and install a browser-trusted certificate to turn on HTTPS on their web servers in a matter of seconds.  Let's Encrypt became available to the public in 2015 and has already issued over 3,000,000 certificates (each published to Certificate Transparency), becoming one of the largest CAs in the web PKI by active certificate volume.  I'll discuss the history and technology behind this project.



Abstract talk Rachel Greenstadt: Deanonymizing Programmers

I will present research showing how to de-anonymize programmers based on their coding style. This is of immediate concern to open source software developers who would like to remain anonymous. On the other hand, being able to de-anonymize programmers can help in forensic investigations, or in resolving plagiarism claims or copyright disputes.

We were able to increase the scale and accuracy of our methods dramatically and can now handle 1,600 programmers, reaching 94% de-anonymization accuracy. In ongoing research, we are tackling the much harder problem of de-anonymizing programmers from binaries of compiled code. This can help identify the author of a suspicious executable file and can potentially aid malware forensics. We demonstrate the efficacy of our techniques using a dataset collected from GitHub, and applying the method to individual git commits.
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