[crypto] Fwd: PROGRAM Crypto Working Group, May 25, 2018
R. Hirschfeld
ray at unipay.nl
Sat May 19 19:01:10 CEST 2018
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: PROGRAM Crypto Working Group, May 25, 2018
Date: 2018-05-18 16:55
From: Secretariaat DM <secdm at tue.nl>
To: Secretariaat DM <secdm at tue.nl>
Dear all,
Herewith I send you the program of the CWG-meeting on Friday, May 25,
2018.
With kind regards / Met vriendelijke groeten,
Anita Klooster
secretary of the section Discrete Mathematics
[cid:image001.gif at 01CB8FB5.88A9C0F0]
Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science
MF 4.058
Office hours: Monday and Friday 08.30-12.30 h / Tuesday and Wednesday
08.30-17.00 h
Telephone: +31 (0)40 2472254
Email: secdm at tue.nl<mailto:secdm at tue.nl>
CRYPTO WORKING GROUP
Friday, May 25, 2018
De Kargadoor (http://www.kargadoor.nl/utrecht/zaalverhuur.html)
Oudegracht 36, Utrecht
Program
10.45 - 11.30 hrs. Boris Škorić (TU/e),
Quantum
stuff with optical PUFs
11.30 - 11.45 hrs. Coffee / tea break
11.45 - 12.30 hrs. Martijn Stam (Univ. of Bristol),
Untagging Tor: A Formal
Treatment of Onion Encryption
(joint work with Jean Paul
Degabriele)
12.30 - 14.00 hrs. Lunch break (lunch not included)
14.00 - 14.45 hrs. Kit Smeets (UCL),
Rounded
Gaussians - Fast and Secure Constant-Time Sampling for Lattice-Based
Crypto
14.45 - 15.00 hrs. Coffee / tea break
15.00 - 15.45 hrs. Jason Donenfeld (Edge Security),
TBA
Abstract talk Boris Škorić: Quantum stuff with optical PUFs
The combination of optical PUFs and quantum optics makes it possible to
build remote authentication protocols whose security relies only on a
single physical assumption, e.g. the assumption that it is difficult to
losslessly emulate a PUF's behaviour. QSA (Quantum Secure
Authentication) is an example of such a protocol. Unfortunately, QSA
requires photons to travel the distance between Alice and Bob twice.
This talk discusses a new protocol, PUF-Enabled Asymmetric Communication
(PEAC), which needs only one-way travel.
http://export.arxiv.org/abs/1802.07573
Abstract talk Martijn Stam: Untagging Tor: A Formal Treatment of Onion
Encryption (joint work with Jean Paul Degabriele, presented at RWC'18
and published at Eurocrypt'18)
Tor is a primary tool for maintaining anonymity online. It provides a
low-latency, circuit-based, bidirectional secure channel between two
parties through a network of onion routers, with the aim of obscuring
exactly who is talking to whom, even to adversaries controlling part of
the network. Tor relies heavily on cryptographic techniques, yet its
onion encryption scheme is susceptible to tagging attacks (Fu and Ling,
2009), which allow an active adversary controlling the first and last
node of a circuit to deanonymize with near-certainty. This contrasts
with less active traffic correlation attacks, where the same adversary
can at best deanonymize with high probability. The Tor project has been
actively looking to defend against tagging attacks and its most concrete
alternative is proposal 261, which specifies a new onion encryption
scheme based on a variable-input-length tweakable cipher.
We provide a formal treatment of low-latency, circuit-based onion
encryption, relaxed to the unidirectional setting, by expanding existing
secure channel notions to the new setting and introducing circuit hiding
to capture the anonymity aspect of Tor. We demonstrate that circuit
hiding prevents tagging attacks and show proposal 261's relay protocol
is circuit hiding and thus resistant against tagging attacks.
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